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early 2000s, Colander (2005) found that 77 percent of economics graduate students 
in elite programs agree with the statement that "economics is the most scientific of 
the social sciences." Some 15 years ago, Richard Freeman (1999, p. 141) speculated 
on the origins of such a conviction in the pages of this journal. His assessment was 
candid: "[Sociologists and political scientists have less powerful analytical tools and 
know less than we do, or so we believe. By scores on the Graduate Record Examina- 
tion and other criteria, our field attracts students stronger than theirs, and our 
courses are more mathematically demanding." 
At first glance, the academic labor market seems to confirm the natives' judg- 
ment about the higher status of economists. They are the only social scientists to 
have a "Nobel" prize, thanks to a grant from the Bank of Sweden to the Nobel 
foundation. Economists command some of the highest levels of compensation in 
American arts and science faculties according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 
In fact, they "earn more and have better career prospects" than physicists and 
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mathematicians (as Freeman wrote); only computer scientists and engineers do 
better. Unlike many academics in the theoretical sciences and humanities, many 
prominent economists have the opportunity to obtain income from consulting fees, 
private investment and partnerships, and membership on corporate boards. For 
instance, Weyl (forthcoming) provides some suggestive evidence that 40 percent 
of the income of economic authors in the fields of finance and industrial organiza- 
tion comes from consulting activities, either with business (finance) or government 
(IO). In 2010, the movie documentary Inside Job exposed the lucrative and possibly 
complacent relations between some of the field's most distinguished members and 
the financial nebulae around Wall Street. 
This much better financial position of economists, particularly in top 
universities, combined with the discipline's emphasis on mastering quantita- 
tive reasoning (widely interpreted as a sign of higher intellectual capabilities) 
certainly stands behind the often dismissive attitude of economists toward the 
other, less-formal social sciences. But there are other reasons for the distant rela- 
tions among social scientists. First, the fields differ in their social composition. 
Self-selection into various disciplines is heavily patterned by social attributes. For 
instance, economics, like physics or philosophy but in sharp contrast to sociology, 
is a very male-dominated field (see Figure 1 ) . Thus, cross-disciplinary relations are 
inevitably permeated by broader patterns of gender difference, stratification, and 
inequality. And while we do not have good comparative data on the social origins 
of social scientists in the United States (but see Bourdieu 1984 and Lebaron 2000 
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on France), we may posit that disparities in the present material conditions of the 
different fields generate important disparities in lifestyle and worldviews as well as 
relational strains between them. 
Second, the social sciences have experienced fast demographic growth since 
World War II, which has produced internal differentiation and hyper-specialization. 
(Abbott 2001; Frank and Gabler 2006). This process has obscured the common 
heritage - the fact that history and moral philosophy gave birth to political economy 
back in the nineteenth century (see Haskell 1977; Ross 1991, for a US-focused 
discussion), while American sociology arose partly from within economics in the 
early part of the twentieth century (Young 2009). 
In this essay, we explore the shifting relationship between economics and the 
other social sciences in four specific dimensions. First, we document the relative 
insularity of economics and its dominant position within the network of the social 
sciences in the United States. Though all disciplines are in some way insular - a 
classic consequence of the heightening of the division of academic labor (Jacobs 
2013) - this trait peculiarly characterizes economics. Second, we document the 
pronounced hierarchy that exists within the discipline, especially in comparison 
with other social sciences. The authority exerted by the field's most powerful 
players, which fosters both intellectual cohesiveness and the active management 
of the discipline's internal affairs, has few equivalents elsewhere. Third, we look 
at the changing network of affiliations of economics over the post-World War II 
period, showing in particular how transformations within higher education (most 
prominently the rise of business schools) and the economy have contributed to 
a reorientation of economics toward business subjects and especially finance. 
Finally, we provide a few insights into the material situation, worldviews, and 
social influence of economists, which also set them apart from their academic 
peers. Taken together, these traits help to define and account for the intellectual 
self-confidence of economists and in turn for their assertive claims on matters of 
public policy. 
When we refer to the "superiority of economists," our double entendre has both 
a descriptive and an explanatory purpose. Economics occupies a unique position 
among academic disciplines. It is characterized by far-reaching scientific claims 
linked to the use of formal methods; the tight management of the discipline from 
the top down; high market demand for services, particularly from powerful and 
wealthy parties; and high compensation. This position of social superiority also 
breeds self-confidence, allowing the discipline to retain its relative epistemo- 
logica! insularity over time and fueling a natural inclination towards a sense of 
entitlement. While the imperialistic expansion of economics into aspects of social 
science that were traditionally outside the economic canon has spurred some 
engagement with noneconomics scholarship, the pattern of exchange remains 
deeply asymmetrical, causing resentment and hostility in return. And while econo- 
mists' unique position gives them unusual power to accomplish changes in the 
world, it also exposes them more to conflicts of interests, critique, and mockery 
when things go wrong. 
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Insularity 
The intellectual trajectories of the social science disciplines have diverged 
importantly during the post-World War II period. Economics has changed since 
its continental youth. It left history behind and turned to the paradigmatic fields 
in the natural sciences, such as physics, for emulation (Mirowski 1989). Unlike 
their more literary forerunners, modern-day economists attribute their intellectual 
standing and autonomy to their reliance on precisely specified and parsimonious 
models and measures. They see the field's high technical costs of entry and its 
members' endeavors to capture complex social processes through equations or 
clear-cut causality as evidence of the discipline's superior scientific ommitments, 
vindicating the distance from and the lack of engagement with the more discursive 
social sciences. In a prominent example, Lazear (2000, pp. 99-100) writes: "The 
ascension of economics results from the fact that our discipline has a rigorous 
language that allows complicated concepts to be written in relatively simple, abstract 
terms. The language permits economists to strip away complexity. Complexity may 
add to the richness of description, but it also prevents the analyst from seeing what 
is essential." An eminent professor echoed this view when he described, this time 
critically, the narrow epistemological demands of his discipline (interviewed by 
Fourcade 2009, p. 91): 'You are only supposed to follow certain rules. If you don't 
follow certain rules, you are not an economist. So that means you should derive 
the way people behave from strict maximization theory. . . . The opposite [to being 
axiomatic] would be arguing by example. You're not allowed to do that. . . . There 
is a word for it. People say 'that's anecdotal.' That's the end of you if people have 
said you're anecdotal . . . [T]he modern thing [people say] is: 'it's not identified.' 
God, when your causality is not identified, that's the end of you." 
For much of the post-World War II period, flexing one's mathematical and 
statistical muscles and stripping down one's argument to a formal and parsimo- 
nious set of equations was indeed the main path to establishing scientific purity 
in economics. With the empirical revolution in the 1990s and 2000s, this function 
has shifted toward a hard-nosed approach to causality focused on research design 
and inference and often extolling the virtues of randomly controlled trials (for 
example, Angrist and Pischke 2010). Although this move has not escaped criti- 
cism (for example, see Learner 2010 and Sims 2010 in this journal), it represents a 
significant departure from the now disparaged over-theoretical orientations of the 
1970s and 1980s. The shift toward applied microeconomics, while very real, has 
not dramatically broadened the network of interdisciplinary connections however. 
To be sure, economists have started to consider topics that are more traditionally 
associated with sociology, political science, and psychology - from political institu- 
tions to family structure, neighborhood effects, peer effects, or (as of late) social 
mobility. Yet cross-disciplinary citation patterns continue to offer evidence of the 
field's relative insularity. Of course, one of the most remarkable facts about US social 
science (continental Europe tends to be more ecumenical) is the extent to which 
all its constituent disciplines work in relative isolation from each other: economics, 
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sociology, political science, and psychology all have high percentages of intra- 
disciplinary citations. But even so, economics stands out markedly, with 81 percent 
of within-field citations in 1997 - against 52 percent for sociology, 53 percent for 
anthropology, and 59 percent for political science (Jacobs 2013, p. 82, who uses 
the NSF Science and Engineering Indicators 2000 , online appendix 6-54, based on a 
sample of the most cited journals in each field). 
There are several reasons for the insularity of economics, most importantly the 
different epistemological cultures of the various social science disciplines and 
the power inequalities between them. First, the theory of action that comes with 
economists' analytical style is hardly compatible with the basic premise of much 
of the human sciences, namely that social processes shape individual preferences 
(rather than the other way around). In economics, by contrast, "de gustibus non 
est disputandum" (Stigler and Becker 1977) l: preferences are "usually assumed 
to be fixed" (Baron and Hannan 1994, p. 11 16). 2 Second, the qualitative methods 
that underpin the work of many interpretive social scientists often do not square 
well with economists' formal aspirations, with their views on causality, or with their 
predilection for methodological and theoretical precision over real-world accuracy. 
Third, even when the substantive terrains overlap, the explicit or implicit pecking 
order between the disciplines often stands in the way of a desirable form of intel- 
lectual engagement. 
Examining the structure of interdisciplinary citations in detail reveals sharp 
differences across disciplines. Surveying academic journals from 1995 to 1997, Pieters 
and Baumgartner (2002) found sharply asymmetric flows between economics and 
the other social sciences. Our analysis of citations in flagship journals for economics, 
sociology, and political science over the period from 2000 to 2009 confirms this 
pattern. As shown in Table 1, articles in the American Political Science Review cite 
the top 25 economics journals more than five times as often as the articles in the 
American Economic Review cite the top 25 political science journals. The asymmetry is 
even starker with regard to the American Sociological Review. While only 2.3 percent 
of the sociologists' citations go to their economic colleagues (often in a critical 
fashion, arguably), just 0.3 percent of economists' citations go to sociologists (again 
only taking into account the top 25 journals in each discipline). Citation data are, 
of course, likely to be biased downwards because sociology and political science 
tend to cast their citation networks more broadly overall and because of the role of 
books (which we do not account for) in those fields. Even so, it is worth pondering 
these asymmetrical patterns, especially since the discrepancy is so large and other 
sources of evidence all point in the same direction. A targeted comparison of cita- 
tions to important figures in sociology and economics who deliberately engaged the 
other discipline shows this well. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the top-cited 
name in US sociology today, received a single mention in the AER during the 2000s 
1 "In matters oftaste, there can be no disputes." 2 In the last 10-15 years however, a few economists have taken amore active interest inthe formation f 
preferences. For examples, see Bowles (1998) and Fehr and Hoff (2011). 
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Table 1 
Citations from the Flagship Journal to Articles Published in the 25 Top Journals in 
Each Discipline, 2000-2009 
(as a percentage of total citations in each journal) 
Cited journals (% of all references) 
Top 25 Top 25 Top 25 Total number of 
economics political science sociology papers/citations 
Citing journal journals journals journals from this journal 
American Economic Review 40.3% 0.8% 0.3% 907/ 
29,958 
American Political Science Review 4.1% 17.5% 1.0% 353/ 
19,936 
American Sociological Review 2.3% 2.0% 22% 399/ 
23,993 
Source: Compiled by the authors from the electronic Institute for Scientific Information's Web of Social 
Science. The high number of papers and cites in the AER is due to the Papers and Proceedings. We also 
looked at this data without the Papers and Proceedings. The patterns are not significantly different. 
(against 60 times in the ASR) , while Gary Becker was reaping 41 citations in the ASR 
(106 in AER). During the same period Max Weber and Mark Granovetter eceived 
four mentions each in the AER , but James Heckman was cited 25 times in the ASR 
by sociologists, and Oliver Williamson, 13.3 
From the vantage point of sociologists, geographers, historians, political scien- 
tists, or even psychologists, economists often resemble colonists settling on their 
land - an image reinforced by some economists' proud claims of "economic impe- 
rialism" (Lazear 2000). Lured by the prospect of a productive crop, economists 
are swift o probe the new grounds. They may ask for guidance upon arrival, even 
partner-up with the locals (with whom they now often share the same data). But 
they are unlikely to learn much from them, as they often prefer to deploy their 
own techniques.4 And in some cases, the purpose has been simply to set the other 
disciplines straight (Nik-Khah and van Horn 2012). Under the influence, notably, of 
Chicago price theory, the dominant economic paradigm has successfully conquered 
a segment of political science, law, accounting, and (for a while) sociology under 
the label of rational choice theory - thus explaining, in part, the directionality of the 
citation patterns observed above. 
Opinion surveys further confirm this analysis. Table 2 suggests that economists 
have in general less regard for interdisciplinarity than their social scientific and 
3 The data comes from ongoing research on social science. For preliminary results, ee Ollion and 
Abbott (forthcoming). 4 Though economists ometimes al o repurpose the techniques of others, asillustrated by the borrowing 
of network analysis from sociology. 
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Table 2 
Agreement or Disagreement with the Proposition: "In general, 
interdisciplinary knowledge is better than knowledge obtained by a single 
discipline." 
% Agree/ % Disagree/ % No answer/ 
American u iversity professors in Strongly agree Strongly disagree Dont know 
Economics 42.1 57.3 0.6 
Sociology 72.9 25.3 1.8 
Political science 59.8 28.0 12.2 
Psychology 78.7 9.4 11.9 
Finance 86.6 9.6 3.8 
History 68.2 31.7 0.1 
Source: From Gross and Simmons' survey about the politics of the American professoriate. 
The survey was conducted in2006. The authors sampled 100 individuals in each field. Return 
rates are low (though not unusually low for this kind of survey) and varied importantly across 
disciplines (economists: 44%; sociologists: 55%; political scientists: 54%; psychologists 49%; 
finance professors: 37%; historians: 54%). We are grateful to Neil Gross for running the 
cross-tabulations on this survey for us here and elsewhere inthe paper. See Gross and Simmons 
(2007) for details about he survey and Gross (2013) for abroader analysis. 
even business school brethren. Economists are the only ones in this group among 
whom a (substantial) majority disagree or strongly disagree with the proposition that 
"in general, interdisciplinary knowledge is better than knowledge obtained from a 
single discipline." Such results are consistent with the notion that economists, with 
their distinctive confidence in the superiority of their own discipline, are less likely 
to feel the need to rely on other disciplines or even to acknowledge their existence. 
As sociologists know well, this dynamic is characteristic of unequal situations: 
those in a central position within a field fail to notice peripheral actors and are also 
largely unaware of the principles that underpin their own domination (Bourdieu 
1984). Instead they tend to rationalize power and inequality as a "just" product of 
merit, justified by effort or talent. A good example of this kind of rationalization 
would be citing higher average scores on the Graduate Record Exam for graduate 
students in economics, or the higher impact factors of economics journals. Soci- 
ologists, however, might point out that such differences between fields are strongly 
structured by social determinants such as class, gender, and race. Meanwhile, 
peripheral actors compulsively orient themselves toward dominant ones, whether 
positively or negatively.5 
5 As another example of this general phenomenon, Fourcade (2006) notes that non-US-based cholars 
are much more likely to define their identities around the recognition they receive (or fail to receive) from American cademic nstitutions than the other way around. 
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Hierarchy Within 
The intellectual structure within the discipline of economics is often evoked to 
explain these asymmetric relations: because economists have managed to preserve 
a more unitary disciplinary core than other social science fields, other fields will 
find it easier to refer to economics, if only to establish a counterargument, than 
the other way around. In other words, the arguments of a unitary discipline are 
clearly identifiable from the outside, while those of a fractious discipline are more 
uncertain. Table 1 showed that citations in the American Economic Review are both 
less interdisciplinary and more concentrated than citations in the political science 
and sociology flagship journals. This suggests that economics more than the other 
fields looks both inward and toward the top of its internal hierarchy. This pattern 
may be interpreted in two ways: there is more consensus in economics than in 
sociology or political science; and there is more control. Of course these two inter- 
pretations are not mutually exclusive: there might be more consensus because 
there is more control (for instance if a consistent view of what constitutes quality 
research is promoted by those who control the top journals); conversely, control 
might be more effective and enforceable because there is more consensus. 
There is substantial evidence that notwithstanding deep political differences 
amongst themselves, economists are more likely to think in a strongly integrated 
and unified framework than other social scientists. For instance, economists agree 
widely on the core set of principles and tools that structure PhD training. They 
also rely on textbooks much more than the other social sciences do, including at 
the graduate level - and graduate textbooks tend to be written by faculty from elite 
departments. In a survey conducted in 1990, graduate education was found to be 
"amazingly similar" across economics PhD programs (Hansen 1991, p. 1085). 
In the interdisciplinary fellowship attribution panels studied by Lamont 
(2009), economists had more homogeneous standards of evaluation within, greater 
confidence in their judgment about research excellence even in other fields, and a 
higher likelihood to stick together as a group than panelists from other disciplines.6 
Only historians were similar to economists in the consistency and cohesiveness of 
their judgments about good historical craftsmanship, but even they were more 
divided internally along political lines, as well as more open to considering a variety 
of criteria when judging other disciplines. Judgments about the scholarly merit of 
proposals were more dispersed and less consensual in the humanities and other 
social scientific fields, making it harder to identify important works both within 
and without. 
On the control side, economists manage their field tightìy. Scholars have long 
noted that top departments in economics exert a remarkably strong influence over 
the discipline's internal abor market (Cole 1983; Whitley 1984) . The most convincing 
6 Studying how mainstream economists established their position within the interdisciplinary School for 
Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS) in Paris, Godechot (2011) finds a similar pattern of 
strong cohesion within and asymmetric relations and exclusion without. 
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empirical study on this point comes from the comparison by Han (2003) of the 
hiring process in seven disciplines (their "tribal regimes"): two from the humani- 
ties - history and English; four from the social sciences - economics, political science, 
psychology, and sociology; and mathematics. Using Lingua Francas annual compila- 
tions in Job Tracks: Who Got Hired Where (1993-2000), Han found, unsurprisingly, that 
all of the disciplines follow a "prestige principle": hires are strongly dependent on 
the prestige of departments as reported by sources such as the National Research 
Council and US News and World Report. The flows of students between departments 
provide unequivocal evidence: they show that universities only hire from institu- 
tions that are like-ranked or higher-ranked. Academia hence resembles the kinship 
systems once described by Claude Lévi-Strauss ([1949] 1969), in which some alli- 
ances (between students and departments) are preferred while others, being taboo, 
simply can not exist. This correlation between prestige and placement, however, 
is strongest in economics. There, the distinctions between clusters are more clear- 
cut than in any other discipline. Economics departments at the very top of the 
pecking order exchange students amongst themselves in higher proportions than 
in other fields, including mathematics. Three conclusions emerge. First, hierarchy is 
much more clearly defined in economics. Second, the field of economics is horizon- 
tally more integrated, with strong norms of reciprocity and cohesion in recruitment 
processes. Third, these norms sustain a high stability of interdepartmental prestige 
hierarchies over time. By contrast, psychology and sociology are the most decentral- 
ized, least cohesive fields and have the least stable prestige rankings. 
Getting a Job 
Not simply the outcome, but also the conduct of the annual junior job market 
confirms these differences across the social sciences. In economics, the process is 
very organized, with most departments collectively deciding on the rank ordering of 
their own students applying for positions. This procedure, which is uncommon in 
many academic fields, is possible only in the context of economists' strong internal 
agreement on quality criteria and because of the field's belief that search and place- 
ment processes can be more efficient hat way, without altering outcomes. Once a 
department's own students have been ranked, market intermediaries ("placement 
officers") are delegated with the task of helping to make matches, by proactively 
selling the products on offer (so to speak) to potential buyers at the other end. 
Finally, a ritualized evaluation process progressively filters the vetted candidates, 
starting with interviews at the annual meetings of the Allied Social Science Associa- 
tions held in early January. For the aspiring PhD graduate, the real action at the 
ASSA conference takes place in the hotel suites where the hiring parties - other 
academic departments, but also government agencies, international institutions, 
and private sector firms - interview job candidates for several days on end. Mean- 
while, in the public meeting rooms, the more-established scholars present their 
papers to their peers. 
The sociology junior labor market stands in sharp contrast to this careful 
orchestration of the circulation of students. To job applicants and faculty in 
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sociology, the very notion of a collectively managed process of matching students 
to job positions would be both unworkable in practice and objectionable in prin- 
ciple. To be sure, social networks play a role and informal contacts sometimes 
precede on-site "fly outs," but they rarely take the form of a formal interview by a 
full committee, as they do in economics. Hierarchies between sociology depart- 
ments are also more uncertain. A vertical structure does exist - sociologists, too, 
have "market stars" and keep a close eye on commonly referenced departmental 
rankings. But one would be hard-pressed to define the principles that underpin 
the pecking order in sociology. Devoid of consensual criteria for generating a 
putative hierarchy, and perhaps also less trusting of their colleagues' judgment, 
sociologists must keep the process more open in order to build up consensus 
from below, inclusively. In economics, consensus is much stronger from the start; 
"information" about candidates is deemed homogeneous and therefore inher- 
ently reliable. As a result, the range of possible options is more tightly defined and 
determined much earlier. 
Getting Published 
The economics publications market is also comparatively more concentrated 
than in other social science disciplines in the sense that the most-cited journals exhibit 
a heavier concentration of papers coming from elite departments in economics 
than in sociology. This is true both in terms of the departments where authors work 
and the departments from which those authors graduated. For instance, according 
to our calculations, the top five sociology departments account for 22.3 percent of 
all authors published in the American Journal of Sociology , but the top five economics 
departments account for 28.7 percent of all authors in the Journal of Political Economy 
(JPE) and 37.5 percent in the Quarterly Journal of Economics ( QJE ). The contrast is 
even starker when one turns to the institutions from which the authors got their 
PhDs, with the top five sociology departments now totaling 35.4 percent in the 
American Journal of Sociology , but 45.4 percent in the Journal of Political Economy and 
a sky-high 57.6 percent in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
An economist might tend to regard this concentration as evidence that, across 
economics departments, intellectual strength is more concentrated in the top 
departments than is the case across sociology departments. Others might highlight 
alternative metrics that are also used for evaluation (books may be more impor- 
tant in some disciplines) and the existence of multiple criteria of worth, which are 
only imperfectly reflected in the hierarchy of scholarly journals.7 Economists, by 
contrast, tend to see institutionalized hierarchies as emergent, truthful indicators of 
some underlying worth, and consequently are obsessed with them. For instance, in 
no other social science can one find the extraordinary volume of data and research 
about rankings (of journals, departments, and individuals) that economists 
7 On the role of books in academic careers for sociologists, see Clemens, Powell, Mcllwaine, and Okamoto 
(1995). While the data used in this study are now 20 years old, there is no evidence that he two-pronged 
situation has changed much. 
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produce - not to mention the centralization of economic research in RePEc (an 
international research archive) and the continued existence of a substantial, if 
marginalized, subfield focused on the history of economics. 
This intense awareness of hierarchies in economics breeds a fierce competi- 
tion for individual status, which may explain some of the most unsettling aspects 
of the field's operating procedures. One notable fact is that several leading 
economic journals edited at particular universities have a demonstrable pref- 
erence for in-house authors, while the American Economic Review is much more 
balanced in its allocation of journal space. Looking at home bias figures since the 
1950s, Coupé (2004, p. 27) finds a consistent pattern of over-representation of 
in-house authors over time. Between 1990 and 2000 for instance, the Harvard-based 
Quarterly Journal of Economics "assigned 13.4% of its space to its own people" and 
10.7 percent to neighboring MIT (against 8.8 percent to the next most prominent 
department, Chicago). Conversely, 9.4 percent of the pages of the Chicago-based 
Journal of Political Economy went to Chicago-affiliated scholars. This was equivalent 
to the share of Harvard and MIT combined (4.5 and 5.1 percent, respectively). Wu 
(2007) shows that these biases actually increased between 2000 and 2003. 8 Our 
data (2003-2012) confirms this domination of Cambridge, Massachusetts, over 
the Quarterly Journal of Economics and (to a lesser extent) Chicago over the Journal 
of Political Economy. The supremacy of Cambridge is even more striking when one 
looks at where the authors obtained their PhDs. In 2003-2012, the proportion 
of Harvard graduates publishing in the QJE was 20.5 percent, just edging MIT 
graduates (16.4 percent). Both were way ahead of the third contributor, Princeton 
(7.4 percent). In the JPE , Harvard, MIT, and Chicago graduates all hover around 
10-11 percent of the authors pool. 
To be sure, there are many reasons for home biases in economic journals, such 
as higher levels of submissions from faculty and graduate (or former graduate) 
students if the journal is edited in-house; a higher likelihood of being encouraged 
by the editor, part of whose job is to bring in good papers through interpersonal 
connections (Laband and Piette 1994; Medoff 2003); or journal philosophical 
style leading to self-selection biases in submission. But similar processes are also 
at play in other fields without producing the same dramatic effects. Thus, even if 
the social structure of the field may explain some of these differences, it does not 
explain them away : the structure itself stands at the core of the phenomenon that 
interests us here, which is the stable supremacy of three departments - Chicago, 
Harvard, and MIT - over the rest of the field, bolstered via control over two 
university-based journals. As a point of comparison, such home bias is virtually 
8 Wu (2007) finds that 14 percent of JPE pages published over that period went o Chicago authors, and a whopping 28 percent of QJE pages went o Harvard-MIT authors (specifically, 15 percent for Harvard and 13 percent for MIT). Our data for the 2003-2012 period shows that he University of Chicago still ranks first with 10.8 percent of the total authors published in the Journal of Political Economy, followed 
by Harvard (6.1 percent) and the MIT (4.1 percent). During the same period, the Quarterly Journal of Economics published almost twice as many authors (14.9 percent) from Harvard than from Chicago (7.0), with the MIT coming third (6.2 percent). 
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nonexistent in the main sociology journal edited out of a university department, 
the American Journal of Sociology, which is based at the University of Chicago.9 This 
suggests that the pattern of home bias in top economics journals, together with 
the stability of rankings of top departments, is not just a coincidence of geog- 
raphy and authors, but stems instead from a particular form of social organization 
and control. 
Getting Together 
Finally, looking at professional associations across social scientific fields 
confirms the more cohesive and hierarchical organization of economics, and the 
more fractious character of its sister disciplines. A rapid comparison of the by-laws 
of the American Economic Association (AEA), the American Sociological Asso- 
ciation (ASA) , and the American Political Science Association (APSA) shows vast 
disparities in the distribution of political power across the disciplines. Despite being 
18,000 members strong, the AEA is a minimalist organization based out of Nashville, 
Tennessee. Dues are low, at $20-$40/year as of 2014. The by-laws are short, at 
1,770 words, and procedures are centralized. There are only six elected officers, and 
only one candidate typically runs for president-elect. As Figure 2 shows in dramatic 
fashion, the AEA leaders are drawn disproportionately from the discipline's elite 
departments: that is, 72 percent of the AEA nonappointed council members are from 
the top five departments, in contrast with only 12 and 20 percent respectively for 
APSA and ASA. The president-elect and program committee run the program 
for the annual meetings, which involves selecting ahead of time the sessions to be 
conducted and the papers from a subset of the sessions to be included in the "Papers 
and Proceedings" issue of the American Economic Review (the May issue following the 
annual meeting) . This procedure ensures a flagging of topics and authors deemed 
most important by the organization's leadership. 
This approach contrasts with the more internally balkanized and also more 
grassroots nature of the American Sociology Association and the American Political 
Science Association. Although these professional associations have fewer members 
than the American Economic Association (about 15,000 for APSA and 13,000 for 
ASA) , their staffs are larger. Procedures are more complex, as reflected in the length 
of their by-laws: 4,657 words for the ASA, 5,529 for APSA. While the AEA is a unitary 
organization, community life among sociologists and political scientists revolves 
around "sections" or organized subfields, each of which has its own procedures, 
dues, awards, and program at the annual meeting. The ASA solves the political 
problem of internal divisions by having contested elections at both the central and 
section levels while the APSA has long resorted to institutionalized horse-trading 
between the dominant constituencies. In both cases, the organizations' leaders are 
9 If anything, our data suggest that here might instead be a bias against Chicago faculty in the American 
Journal ofSociology, who barely make it to the top 20 with a mere 1.4 percent of published papers. Although 
this proportion rises to 6.9 percent for former Chicago sociology graduates, they are still topped by both 
Harvard PhDs (9.4 percent) and Stanford PhDs(8 percent). 
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Figure 2 
Institutional Composition of the Executive Council of Three Disciplinary 
Organizations by Ranking of Departments of the Nonappointed Officers, 2010-2014 
Notes: The ranking of departments is based on the U.S. News and World Report 2012 ranking of best 
graduate schools, by discipline. The "unranked" category comprises mostly departments that do not have 
a graduate program, and a very small number of foreign i stitutions. 
drawn primarily from nonelite institutions, as shown in Figure 2. Because the disci- 
plinary core is less identifiable and more contested, members of the ASA and the 
APSA also identify less with it: the rank-and-file is less bound to the elite and both 
associations fulfill primarily a democratic purpose of integration across the board, 
an openness that is also reflected in the structuring of their conference programs. 
However, the marginalization of most of the association leaders at the ASA and the 
APSA from the high-prestige core of the discipline, and also from political power, 
also explains both organizations' frantic striving for influence, manifested, among 
other things, in their Washington addresses. To support this more elaborate infra- 
structure and expensive residence, dues for both organizations are among the 
highest in the social sciences: $50 to $350/year for the ASA; and $40 to $320 for 
the APSA - not counting section dues. 
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The Rise of Finance 
For all the relative insularity and autonomy of economics, economists still do 
engage other disciplines. Our analysis of five top economics journals shows that 
between 19 and 25 percent of citations are outside the discipline, a fairly stable 
pattern since the end of World War II. But when economics goes interdisciplinary, 
where does it turn? Have the disciplinary connections of economics changed over 
time, and if so, what does this tell us about the evolution of the field? 
This framing provides us with a different road into the recent history of eco- 
nomics than much of the literature, which is often focused tightly on trends within 
economies: examples include the transformation of publishing patterns in economic 
journals (Card and DellaVigna 2013), the rise and fall of fields within economics in 
volume (Kelly and Bruestle 2011) and in relative prestige (Ellison 2010), or the down- 
ward trend in the use of mathematics and in the publication of theoretical papers 
(Hamermesh 2013). Instead, we begin by analyzing the network of relations between 
economics and other disciplines over time. In other words, we start from the assump- 
tion that who you cite says something about who you are. We find that changing 
patterns of external citations indeed tell us quite a lot about the inner situation of the 
discipline and the changing relative power of different constituencies. 
Figure 3 offers a representation of economics' extra-disciplinary references, 
based on our extensive study of citations in five top economics journals that were 
all founded well before World War II: the Quarterly Journal of Economics (founded in 
1899), the Journal of Political Economy (1899), the American Economic Review (1911), 
Econometrica (1933), and the Review of Economic Studies (1933). 10 The figure tells a 
story that is partly familiar, partly less so. The points in the figure show the share of 
outside-the-field citations in economics journals going to journals in the fields 
of finance (F), statistics (S), business (B), political science (P), mathematics (M), 
sociology (s), and law (L). Because there is considerable fluctuation from year 
to year, we show the patterns of the data as smoothed curves. The figure shows 
the dramatic rise of economics' engagement with mathematics and statistics in the 
post-World War II period. The high point of this engagement, in the mid-1970s, 
coincides with the low point of engagement with the other social sciences (such 
as political science and sociology) , as well as with practical enterprises, such as law 
and, with a slight delay, business. Notwithstanding the foundations' and govern- 
ment's efforts to promote interdisciplinary ventures under the "behavioral sciences" 
label in the 1950s, the social sciences became clearly more estranged from one 
another in the 1960s-70s. Nor was economics the only driving force in this process: 
cross-disciplinary experiments at Harvard (the Department of Social Relations) and 
Carnegie-Mellon failed, and all the various fields retreated into their own distinctive 
form of abstraction and high theory (Steinmetz 2005; Isaac 2010). 
10 Citations were obtained from the Institute for Scientific Information's Web of Social Science. The 
lines were drawn using a smoothing coefficient. Seethe online Appendix available with this paper at 
http://ejep.org for details. 
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Figure 3 
Extradisciplinary Citation in Five Top Economics Journals 
(to papers infields of finance , statistics , business , political science , mathematics , sociology , 
and law) 
Source: The raw citation data were collected from the Institute ofScientific Information's W<?¿> of Social 
Sciences. 
Notes: The points in the figure show the share of outside-the-field c tations infive conomics journals 
going to journals in the fields of Finance (F), Statistics (S), Business (B), Political Science (P), 
Mathematics (M), Sociology (s), and Law (L). The top five conomics journals are the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (founded in 1899 ), Journal of Political Economy (1899), American Economic Review (1911), 
Econometrica (1933), and Review of Economic Studies (1933). We show the patterns of the data as smoothed 
curves. The lines were drawn using a smoothing coefficient. Seethe online Appendix available with this 
paper at http://ejep.org for details. 
The interdisciplinary ecology as it stood toward the end of the period depicted 
in Figure 3 looks very different. Citations to mathematics in the leading economics 
journals are practically gone and those to statistics have faltered. The other social 
sciences have made a modest comeback, particularly political science (which has 
had a partial conversion to rational choice theory) . But the most striking trend from 
Figure 3 in recent decades is the continuous rise of finance as a purveyor of "inter- 
disciplinary" references for economics. 
In judging the magnitude of this trend toward finance, it is important to note 
that our estimate of the rise of the role of finance within economics in Figure 3 is 
very conservative. Our list of five top economics journals does not include any 
finance journal. Figure 4 presents an analysis of citations among our list of five top 
economics journals plus two more: the Journal of Finance (founded in 1946) over 
time; and the British-based Economic Journal (founded in 1891) - a core generalist 
publication for economists for much of the twentieth century, on par with the JPE 
and QJE at the beginning of the period. Self-citations are not counted in the total of 
cross-citations. Reading the graph, we see that in 2010-2011, the AER got 33 percent 
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Figure 4 
Citations among Six Economics Journals and One Finance Journal 
(excluding self-citations; (Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE), Economic Journal 
(EJ), Journal of Political Economy (JPE), American Economic Review (AER), 
Econometrica (ECTRA), Review of Economic Studies (RES), and Journal of 
Finance (JFIN) ) 
Source: The raw citation data were collected from the ISI's Web of Social Sciences. 
Notes: Figure 4 presents an analysis of citations among six economics journals plus the Journal ofFinance. 
Self-citations are not counted in the total of cross-citations. Reading the graph, we see that in 2010-2011, 
the AER got 33 percent of the cross-citations among that set of journals, self-citations removed. In 
addition to the data points, the graph shows lines drawn using a smoothing coefficient. 
of the cross-citations among that set of journals, self-citations removed. The graph 
shows a lot of action at the top - the meteoric return of the QJE to prominence, 
the relative decline of Econometrica and JPE - but two other salient transformations 
over the very long run are the constant decline of the British journals ( RES and EJ), 
particularly the EJ (which disappears into near-oblivion) and the rise of the Journal of 
Finance. Our bibliometric network data (not shown) indicates that by the 2000s, the 
yFwas most closely integrated with the core US-based publications, receiving between 
7 and 11 percent of all the cross-references (excluding self-citations) in the AER , QJE 
and JPE. In other words, the JF9 which would not have been considered an economics 
journal when it was first founded, has become an integral part of the economics disci- 
plinary matrix. Other finance journals have followed suit, too, as financial economics 
has become the dominant approach in the field (Jovanovic 2008). 
11 
11 The first issue of the Journal of Financial Economics came out in 1974, and it is now ranked as the 
eighth economics journal by impact factor. The Review of Financial Studies , first published in 1988, ranks 
twelfth. The Journal ofFinance now ranks fifth by impact factor overall in economics, edging ahead of the 
much older Review of Economic Studies. 
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The institutional rise of finance as an intellectual powerhouse within economics 
follows from the establishment of a teaching base in business schools in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Over that period, business schools, which control the 
production of certified managers (through the MBA degree), have evolved from 
practitioner-dominated programs struggling for academic legitimacy to become 
the largest employers of trained social scientists, now rivaling traditional academic 
departments in the size and distinction of their faculties. A survey from 2004 found 
549 economics PhDs teaching in the top 20 US business schools, as compared 
with 637 economics PhDs in the top 20 economics departments (Blau 2006). This 
absorption of increasingly large contingents of economics PhDs has turned business 
schools into formidable players within economic science itself - a transforma- 
tion that is attested by the remarkable string of Nobel Prizes in economic science 
awarded to scholars based in business schools since 1990 (Fourcade and Khurana 
2013), including Eugene Fama, Oliver Williamson, Robert Engle, Michael Spence, 
Robert Merton, Myron Scholes, Merton Miller, John Harsanyi, and Robert Fogel. 
Our own analysis of papers published in the American Economic Review since 
the 1950s reveals a rapid rise in business school affiliations among authors, and a 
simultaneous and sharp decline in government-based authors. The share of authors 
whose primary affiliation is to a business school has increased steadily from a low 
3.2 percent in the 1950s to 17.9 percent in the 2000s. Conversely, contributions 
from scholars located in government agencies have become marginal.12 
As the academic field of economics shifted toward business schools - and away 
from government - economists faced a new set of practical, intellectual, and polit- 
ical entanglements: higher levels of compensation, new connections and consulting 
opportunities, and often different politics as well (Jelveh, Kogut, and Naidu 2014). 
In the 1980s, suspicion of government action grew markedly within the field, and 
economists arguably supplied part of the intellectual rationale for the deregulatory 
movement in public policy and for the expanded use of price and market mecha- 
nisms in education, transportation, healthcare, the environment, and elsewhere 
(Blyth 2002). Financial economists argued forcefully that the purpose of corpora- 
tions was to maximize shareholder value, and provided a scientific justification for 
the management practices favored by a new generation of corporate raiders: lever- 
aged buy-outs, mergers and acquisitions, and compensating corporate executives 
with stock options.13 In a recent indictment of the "pervasiveness of the capture 
of economists by business interests," Zingales (2013) found that, when none of 
their authors worked in a business school, economics articles were significantly 
12 Measures are based on self-declared affiliations  the articles we surveyed. When authors mentioned 
several ffiliations (a trait that has increased over time) , we adopted the following procedure: If there was a clear order, we opted for the first institution. Otherwise, and in an attempt to not artificially increase the share of secondary affiliations, we gave priority to "economics department" when mentioned equally with 
any another institution. Seethe online Appendix available with this paper at http://e-iep.ore: f  details. 13 For instance, see Fligstein a d Shin (2007), Jung and Dobbin (2012), Fourcade and Khurana (2013), 
and Heilbron, Verheul, and Quak (2014). 
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"less likely to be positive on the level of executive compensation, and significantly 
more likely to be negative" (p. 139). 
14 
A Life of Their Own 
Economists have distinctive opinions, beliefs, and tastes compared to academics 
in other fields and to the broader American public. Evidence on this topic is 
dispersed and must be pieced together from various sources. A sizeable share comes 
from economists themselves: the home-grown literature on the topic is abundant. 
The field is filled with anxious introspection, prompted by economists' feeling 
that they are powerful but unloved, and by robust empirical evidence that they are 
different. In some classic examples, Marwell and Ames (1981) found that first-year 
graduate students in economics at the University of Wisconsin were less likely to 
make contributions to a public good in a structured laboratory game. In this journal, 
Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) cite a range of evidence suggesting that studying 
economics inhibits cooperation. The extent to which such differences persist across 
the contexts of different laboratory studies, and the underlying cause of any differ- 
ences that do persist, remains controversial. Is it that learning economics makes 
people more accepting of self-interested behavior in themselves and others? Or 
perhaps it is that the discipline attracts more egoistic people? Frey and Meier (2005) 
look at voluntary student contributions to social funds at the University of Zurich, 
and find that those who will later choose economics as a field of study are less likely 
to contribute - even before their economic studies begin. Whatever the underlying 
dynamic, there is suggestive and convergent evidence that economists are either 
more candid about pursuing their self-interest, or simply more selfish (by disposition 
or as a result of training) . 
Economists are likely to find themselves in a minority position on some of their 
dearest ideas. Sapienza and Zingales (2013) argue that the more American econo- 
mists agree among themselves, the more distant they grow from average Americans. 
In general, of course, economists favor using market-based solutions to address 
social issues (Whaples 2009). They support allowing payments to be made to organ 
donors, but the public finds the very thought distasteful. A sizeable majority of econ- 
omists believes that trade protectionism is economically harmful, but when asked 
whether "buying American" is good for the economy, the average American agrees 
it is (Sapienza and Zingales 2013, p. 638). Economists think that a market mecha- 
nism such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system of pollution permits is a more 
cost-effective mechanism to curb climate change than regulatory steps such as car 
emissions standards, but most of their fellow citizens beg to differ. Economists may 
advise governments, but they often do not convince the people. 
14 The sample included 150 of the most cited ownloaded SSRN papers prior to 2008 using the search 
key word "executive compensation" (excluding survey papers). 
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Academic economists vote more to the left than American citizens, like most of 
their university-based peers. They have been doing so for as long as political opinion 
surveys have been administered in this setting: Ladd and Lipset (1976) offer a 
classic early survey. Even though on average the contingent of libertarians among 
economists is much larger than among the US voting public, as a group, econo- 
mists still claim to trust the government more - with some important institutional 
variations. According to the Gross and Simmons survey of the American professo- 
riate (see Gross 2013), economists are situated about halfway between humanities 
scholars and other social scientists to their left and business schools professors to 
their right in most of their political opinions. For example, two-thirds of sociologists 
say that corporations make too much profit, but only one-third of economists and 
virtually no finance professors think so. The overwhelming majority of sociologists 
(90 percent) endorse the proposition that "the government should do more to help 
needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into debt," but barely one-half of 
the economists and one-third of the finance scholars agree with that proposition. 
The worldviews of economists, like those of all individuals, are in part the 
product of their particular social entanglements - the material and symbolic situ- 
ation and trajectory of their group, and that of each individual within it. Relative 
to other academics, economists do better in terms of income. According to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the mean salary for the 11,000 economics teachers 
in colleges, universities, and professional schools was $103,000 in 2012, and 
$160,000 for the top 10 percent. For comparisons, the mean figure for sociolo- 
gists was $76,000, with the top 10 percent at $118,000. These totals do not count 
additional sources of income from consulting work or other activities, which can 
be substantial (Weyl forthcoming). Furthermore, economists' material situation 
has improved noticeably over the last two decades, particularly for the best-paid 
members of the profession, who now narrowly outstrip the best-paid engineers; 
by contrast, the median real wage in many academic professions (the humani- 
ties, mainly) and in the United States at large barely rose over the same period, 
as we see in Figure 5 (which also covers teachers at junior colleges in addition to 
colleges, universities, and professional schools). How this experience of group 
social mobility and growing intrafield inequalities may have affected economists' 
appreciation of the deteriorating relative economic situation of their less-fortunate 
fellow academics and citizens is an open question. 
This growing social distance of economists from the public at large would be 
irrelevant if economists were not making it their mission to maximize the welfare of 
ordinary people. Economics as a profession is prominently intertwined with public 
administrations, corporations, and international organizations; these institutions 
not only provide economists with resources and collect their data, they also foster a 
"fix it" culture - or, as sociologists would put it, a particular "habitus," a disposition 
to intervene in the world (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Economists, particularly 
modern economists, want to fix things, which is both a product of their theoretical 
confidence and of the position of their discipline within society (Mitchell 1998). For 
instance, economic models routinely invoke the mythical figure of the benevolent 
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Figure 5 
Annual Median and 90th Percentile Wages in Selected Disciplines, 1999-2012 
(2012 constant dollars) 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/oes 
/tables, htm. 
Note: Figure 5 covers teachers atjunior colleges in addition tocolleges, universities, and professional schools. 
"social planner," imagining what this entity would do to make the world richer, 
healthier, and less vulnerable to shocks. Economists have developed a precise theo- 
retical framework for evaluating when markets produce efficiency and when market 
failures can occur, and they have a vast econometric arsenal at their disposal to parse 
out the effects of actual policy proposals. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
they also started running narrowly specified field experiments, increasingly putting 
the administration of social policy or development aid at the service of research (for 
example, Banerjee and Duflo 2013) . (One may note in passing that the experiments 
of economists are quite different from those of sociologists, who tend to run experi- 
ments to understand how people live.) Finally, economists are fairly certain about 
their ultimate judgment criteria - their predilection for efficiency over fairness, the 
eliciting of preferences from behavior, and the design of experiments around a 
tight menu of choices. These criteria positively sanction both an orientation toward 
policy adjudication and advice, and a distinctive willingness, even eagerness to serve 
and intervene. If things don't work the way they should , then a smart readjustment, 
a "nudge," may even be called for (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
Here again, a comparison with sociologists is telling: sociologists might vie for 
the position of the prince's counselor too, but they have been much less successful 
at securing influence. First, economics and sociology have different orientations 
to time. Economists generally pay little attention to history, "live in the now," and 
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"see trajectories from the present forward," while sociologists have the reverse 
intellectual attitude, looking at the present as the outcome of a set of past 
processes (Abbott 2005). Thus, sociologists often find themselves both effectively 
marginalized and shying away from direct policy involvement. Their intellectual 
habits center around social critique precisely because they are already outside: 
in the words of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, they "make a virtue of necessity." 
Self-perceptions reflect these differences well. In Gross and Simmons's (2007) 
survey of the American professoriate, economists described themselves mainly as 
"intellectuals" and "scientists." Sociologists were most comfortable with the terms 
"social critics" and "scientists," unconsciously embracing their own peripheral 
position but without abandoning the mantel of science. The combination of soci- 
ologists' desire for relevance with their deep ambivalence toward power produces 
a very different set of dispositions: sociologists analyze critically, sometimes rouse 
and stir, but they rarely venture to propose fixes and remedies (they are not in a 
position to do so and would perhaps be reluctant to even if they had the opportu- 
nity). Political scientists, interestingly, saw themselves primarily as "intellectuals," 
but perhaps reflecting their much closer proximity to the political game, they 
were also somewhat more likely to distance themselves from the label "scientists" 
than either sociologists or economists. 
The upshot of economists' confident attitude toward their own interventions 
in the world is that economics, unlike sociology or political science, has become a 
powerful transformative force. Economists do not simply depict a reality out there, 
they also make it happen by disseminating their advice and tools. In sociological 
terms, they "perform" reality (Callón 1998). Aspects of economic theories and 
techniques become embedded in real-life economic processes, and become part 
of the equipment that economic actors and ordinary citizens use in their day-to-day 
economic interactions. In some cases, the practical use of economic technologies 
may actually align people's behavior with its depiction by economic models. By 
changing the nature of economic processes from within, economics then has the 
power to make economic theories truer. For example, MacKenzie (2006) discusses 
how academic financial theories gave rise to enormous markets in futures, options, 
and other derivative financial instruments: the use of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
formula by market actors altered economic processes in such a way that it improved 
the fit of the model to the reality of option prices. 
The world has changed in important ways under the influence of economists. 
Economic reasoning, expertise, and technologies permeate capitalist activities, 
culture (including the media and best-seller lists), and institutions, from hospitals 
through courts to universities (Hirschman and Popp Berman 2014). Economists 
dispense their expertise on practically all matters of public policy and have made 
steady gains in business and government, often in top political positions (Montecinos 
and Markoff 2009). Finance ministries, central banks, government agencies, inter- 
national organizations, and dominant consultancies harbor large concentrations 
of professionally trained economists, who claim tutelary power over "the economy" 
while viewing societies as involved in a never-ending but ultimately beneficial 
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process of economic reconstruction. Finally, the rational-formalist language of the 
economics profession underpins its universalistic aspirations. Economic fashions 
circulate across borders, drawing people and techniques in their wake. Much more 
than sociology or political science, economics is a symbolically and materially global- 
ized discipline (Fourcade 2006). 
Thus, most economists feel quite secure about their value-added. They are 
comforted in this feeling by the fairly unified disciplinary framework behind them, 
higher salaries that many of them believe reflect some true fundamental value, 
and a whole institutional structure - from newspapers to congressional commit- 
tees to international policy circles - looking up to them for answers, especially in 
hard times. In fact, the recent economic and financial crisis has arguably made the 
discipline of economics as a whole more, not less, visible, and its expertise more 
sought-after: the deep recessions of the early 1980s and the Great Depression of the 
1930s had the same effect. 
But because economics is a transformative force, and because its operatives tend 
to be in charge, economists are also more exposed. The financial and economic 
maelstrom of 2008, which few in the economics profession had anticipated (but 
whose institutional roots could be traced back, in part, to actions some of them had 
lobbied for), led many economists to engage in soul-searching about their lack of 
awareness, their intellectual bullishness, and the reliability of their claims to exper- 
tise. Following discomforting interviews in the 2010 movie documentary Inside Job , in 
which prominent members of the profession emphatically denied the possibility of 
conflicts of interest for economists, the American Economic Association promoted a 
set of ethical guidelines. From his powerful tribune at the New York Times , Nobel-prize 
winner Paul Krugman (2009) aired the dirty laundry of macroeconomics - usually 
buried in esoteric models - in a fierce and very public manner. Economists also began 
to talk about distributional issues, the bread and butter of that other social science, 
sociology, in a way that was unimaginable just two or three decades before. To be sure, 
the changing facts of inequality warrant his newfound interest (Piketty 2014) . But the 
intellectual winds in economics may be shifting, too. 
Conclusion: Humble, Competent People? 
"If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, compe- 
tent people, on a level with dentists, that would be splendid!" Keynes ([1931] 
1962, p. 373) famously wrote. Most modern economists have a strong practical 
bent. They believe in the ideal of an expert-advised democracy, in which their 
competence would be utilized and on display in high-profile, non-elective posi- 
tions in government and other institutions. But democratic societies are deeply 
suspicious of (nondemocratic) expertise; and economic advice, unlike dentistry, 
can never be humble. The fact is that - in some ways true to its philosophical 
origins - economics is a very moral science after all. Unlike atoms and molecules, 
the "objects" upon which economists seek to act have a perspective on the world, 
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too. Human life is messy, never to be grasped in its full complexity or shaped 
according to plan: people act in unanticipated ways; politics makes its own 
demands; cultures (which economists do not understand well) resist. Thus, the 
very real success of economists in establishing their professional dominion also 
inevitably throws them into the rough and tumble of democratic politics and into a 
hazardous intimacy with economic, political, and administrative power. It takes 
a lot of self-confidence to put forward decisive expert claims in that context. That 
confidence is perhaps the greatest achievement of the economics profession - but 
it is also its most vulnerable trait, its Achilles' heel. 
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